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ABSTRACT 
We simulate social network games of a portfolio selection to analyze how knowledge, preferences 
of agents and their level of omniscience affect their decision-making. The key feature of the paper 
is that preferences and the level of omniscience of agents very much determine the ways agents 
make their decision. While omniscient agents respond very rapidly to the changing market 
conditions, non-omniscient agents are more resistant to such changes. By introducing one-time 
shock, we found that its efficiency depends on the level of omniscience of agents, with much 
stronger efficiency under omniscient agents. 
 
Keywords: small world networks, stochastic finance, portfolio analysis, market 
shocks, non-omniscience. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Developments on financial markets can generally be characterized by the 
following: uncertainty, seeking for information, and social networks, while key 
elements are an individual with his knowledge, preferences and other personal 
characteristics, and information about the assets. Individuals on the markets are 
non-omniscient agents in the sense that they possess only “small bits of 
incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge” (Hayek 1945, 519).1 Such 
Hayekian individuals seek information, cooperate and make social networks, 
learn, choose, take risks, compete, imitate and trade with each other. They 
improve their knowledge through public and private data banks, learning from 
their experiences and through communication processes in the social network, 
which induce herd behavior. Herd behavior has been documented on financial 
markets (Lux 1995; Cont and Bouchaud 2000; Shiller 2002; Bikhchandani et al. 
1998). Different knowledge, preferences and other specific characteristics of 
agents mean that despite identical data people make different expectations 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Hirshleifer 2002). This means that despite agents 
are prone to copying more profitable strategies, tradeoff between the efficiency 
and complexity of strategies and the desire to take as simple strategies as possible 
might lead them to take less profitable ones, as well (Rubinstein 1998). 
 
Very often phenomena on the markets are shocks that are especially connected 
with stock bubbles and crashes (Abreu and Brunnermeier 2003). As regards 
shocks, it is important how fast agents on markets perceive them, if they perceive 
them, how persistent they are and how effective they are. We tackle these 
questions through simulations using different levels of omniscience and attitudes 
towards risk of agents. 
 
                                                 
1 We avoid using terms rational and irrational behavior and consider them inappropriate, as the 
ultimate goal of individuals is always to satisfy their goals (Mises 1996, Rand 1964). If A is 
preferred to B and B to C, logically A should be preferred to C. But if C is preferred to A, this 
regards the fact that two acts of an individual can never be synchronous as value judgments are not 
immutable (Mises 1996, 103).  
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In the paper, we model and simulate such games of a portfolio analysis on real 
data, with agents using social networks and choosing between stocks of two bank 
corporations, Citigroup (NYSE: C) and CreditSuisse (NYSE: CS), or the portfolio 
of the two. In a general framework of Chapter 2, we put down the model, which is 
continued with the simulation results in Chapter 3. Final Chapter gives some 
concluding remarks. 
 
2 General framework 
 
2.1 The model 
 
There are ( )1, 2, ,1000A = …  infinitely lived agents, distributed on the lattice and 
connected in the small world network (Watts and Strogatz 1998; Wasserman and 
Faust 1994). The network ( ),g V E=  is a set of vertices { }1 2 1000, , ,V v v v= … , 
representing agents, and edges { }1 2, , , nE e e e= … , representing their pairwise 
relations. If two agents are connected, we denote ij g∈ , while ij g∉  represents 
two unconnected vertices. Using adjacency matrix, 1ij =  if ij g∈  and 0ij =  if 
ij g∉ . We use undirected graph, where edges are unordered pairs of vertices, thus 
if 1 1ij ji= ⇔ = . In a small world network, people have many local and some 
global connections with others, which we get by rewiring some of the connections 
(Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Small world network 
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In the network, a degree of an agent is the number of agents to which one is 
connected. It is denoted ( )ik A . The average degree of agents in the network 
equals ( ) 6ik g = , and the probability that a connection from an agent iA  is 
rewired to the randomly chosen agent jA  in the network equals 0.01p = . The 
network remains unchanged once connections are rewired. There are no isolated 
agents in the network. Distance in the network between the two agents is 
represented as the shortest path between them, and diameter represents the longest 
distance in the network. In one representation of a network, the average distance 
among all pairs of agents is ( ), 12.818i jd A A = , while the diameter equals 
( )( )max , 28i jD d A A= = . 
 
According to their initial preferences, agents are split into two groups; the first 
consists of those who prefer Citigroup stocks, and the second of those who prefer 
CreditSuisse stocks. We denote 0 1u≤ ≤  the share of agents who prefer stocks of 
CreditSuisse, and ( )1 u−  a share of agents preferring stocks of Citigroup. Agents 
from both groups can choose between pure strategy, which means that either they 
opt for stocks of Citigroup or CreditSuisse or make a portfolio of the two. We 
denote with C , if agents who prefer Citigroup stocks decide for pure strategies 
and Cp  if they opt for a portfolio. Contrary, we denote CS  when agents who 
prefer CreditSuisse stocks decide for pure strategies and CSp  if they opt for a 
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portfolio. In either case, portfolio is selected from the part of stocks one prefers, 
0 1pi≤ ≤ , while remainder ( )1 pi−  represents stocks of the other company. 
Agents accumulate their wealth in time according to the strategy they choose, 
while they can change between the strategies in every period during the game. 
 
( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) [ ]
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
1 1
1
t C t C
t Cp t Cp
t CSp t CSp
t CS t CS
W A W A Cr
W A W A Cr pi CSr pi
W A W A CSr pi Cr pi
W A W A CSr
+
+
+
+
= ⋅ +
⎡ ⎤= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ −⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ −⎣ ⎦
= ⋅ +
 (1). 
 
( )1tW + •  and ( )tW •  represent wealth of an agent in time t  and 1t + , while ( )•  
denotes the strategy played by an agent in time. Returns of stocks, denoted Cr  
and CSr , are exogenous to the agents and agents cannot foresee them, neither do 
they know the system how prices change in time. ( )1, 2, ,t T= … .  
 
We also introduce the level of non-omniscience of agents denoted 0 1κ≤ ≤ . It is 
defined through Fermi logistic probability function (Szabó and Tőke 1998) as 
 
( ) ( )( ) 11 exp i jW A W A κ −⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤℘= + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦  (2) 
 
This means that in every time period t  an agent iA  chooses one of the agents to 
which he his directly connected, jA , and compares his payoff, ( )iW A , to the 
payoff of selected agent, ( )jW A . It depends upon the level of coefficient κ  
which strategy agent iA  will adopt. For 0κ = , he always adopts the strategy that 
gives higher outcome. We denote such agent omniscient agent. Higher the value 
of κ  and smaller the difference between the two payoffs, more likely it is that an 
agent will not choose the strategy with higher payoff. Such agent is denoted non-
omniscient. Contrary, lower the value of a coefficient κ  and bigger the difference 
between the two payoffs, more likely it is that an agent will choose the strategy 
with higher payoff. This goes in line with Rubinstein’s tradeoff. In simulations, 
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we use 0.001κ =  for omniscient agent and 1.0κ =  for non-omniscient agent. 
Once agents lose a link to a particular strategy, they are not able to get it back in 
future and cannot choose such strategy again. 
 
Finally, we put one-time shock into the stock of Citigroup in time 2t =  by 
lowering the return of a stock by 500 bps, ceteris paribus. Thus, instead of a 
positive return of 3.165 percentage points we apply a loss of 1.835 percentage 
points. 
 
2.2 Data 
 
We used data from finance.yahoo.com portal. Data refer to adjusted closed prices 
of both stocks from 21.1.1999 until 19.11.2008. An adjusted closed price is a 
price adjusted for splits and dividends. In order to use the same time-period for 
both stocks, we omit adjusted closed prices for the stock for a time units if the 
other stock was inactive on that day. In each game, we have 2.457T =  iterations. 
Adjusted close price for Citigroup and CreditSuisse are plotted in Figures 2a, b, c. 
 
Figure 2a: Daily returns of CreditSuisse 
 
 
 
Figure 2b: Daily returns of Citigroup 
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Figure 2c: Daily returns of CreditSuisse and Citigroup 
 
 
 
3 Simulation results 
 
3.1 Omniscient agents 
 
We first simulate games with omniscient agents. Sizes of the step on both 
variables are 0.1  throughout the sample spaces 0 , 1u pi≤ ≤ . The averages of 15 
realizations of games are represented in Figures 3. 
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Figure 3a: Omniscient agents who choose C 
 
 
 
Figure 3b: Omniscient agents who choose Cp 
 
 
 
Figure 3c: Omniscient agents who choose CSp 
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Figure 3d: Omniscient agents who choose CS 
 
 
 
Color-palettes in the figures represent shares of agents who choose for an 
individual strategy in the final stage of the game.  
 
Figures reveal that the most relevant factor of decision-making of omniscient 
agents are returns of stocks. Initial preferences of agents, measured through 
coefficient u , become significant only around the limit cases, when agents prefer 
portfolio.  
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We now simulate games with a shock of 500 bps in 2t =  included and present 
results in Figures 4. 
 
Figure 4a: Omniscient agents under shock who choose C 
 
 
 
Figure 4b: Omniscient agents under shock who choose Cp 
 
 
 
Figure 4c: Omniscient agents under shock who choose CSp 
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Figure 4d: Omniscient agents under shock who choose CS 
 
 
 
A comparison of Figures 4 to Figures 3 reveals that a shock to the Citigroup stock 
rapidly changes the behavior of agents. Due to a shock, agents turn away of pure 
strategies of having Citigroup stock and in a much greater extend opt for a 
diversification or even for playing pure CreditSuisse strategies. This is due the 
fact that the difference in returns of the two stocks is very small in time, which 
makes shock, despite only one-time shock, very significant in relative terms. 
 
We now turn to some individual games under different initial values of u  and plot 
their entire developments. 
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0.5u =  
 
We first choose 0.5u =  and 0.3pi =  and compare games without a shock, plotted 
in Figures 5a, b, with the games with included shock in Figures 6a, b. u  is 
changing in time, while pi  is constant. C  in figures represent the share of agents 
that choose Citigroup, Cp  represent the share of agents who prefer Citigroup 
stocks and choose for a portfolio. Similarly, CS  and CSp  represent shares of 
agents who prefer CreditSuisse stocks and opt for pure strategies or portfolio. 
 
Figure 5a: Game with omniscient agents 
 
 
 
Figure 5b: Game with omniscient agents 
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In a no-shock game, possession of Citigroup stocks is a dominant strategy played 
by omniscient agents. We see from the figure that agents come close to a 
unanimous solution in less then fifty time intervals. 
 
Figure 6a: Game with a shock 
 
 
 
Figure 6b: Game with a shock 
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Comparing the two figures reveals that one-time shock of 500 bps on Citigroup 
stock changed the behavior of agents and the course of the game drastically. Now, 
none of the strategies is dominant in the long run.  Table 1 presents some details 
on early intervals. Column 1 represents time interval, columns 2-3 represent daily 
returns of Citigroup and CreditSuisse stocks, columns 4-7 represent shares of 
agents playing each strategy in a no-shock game, while columns 8-11 represent 
shares of agents playing each strategy in a game with a shock. We presence of a 
shock is denoted with bold in the third line of the second column. The coefficient 
of the return under the shock needs to be reduced by 500 bps to 0.9817 . 
 
Table 1: Games with no shock and with a shock 
 
t Cr CSr C Cp CSp CS C_s Cp_s CSp_s CS_s 
1 0.9842 0.9679 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
2 1.0317 1.0032 0.273 0.242 0.235 0.25 0.252 0.255 0.247 0.246 
3 1.0420 0.9968 0.468 0.185 0.267 0.08 0.434 0.185 0.332 0.049 
4 0.9731 1.0132 0.659 0.079 0.241 0.021 0.354 0.237 0.322 0.087 
5 1.0313 1.0099 0.781 0.031 0.186 0.002 0.507 0.135 0.331 0.027 
6 1.0098 1.0227 0.809 0.028 0.163 0 0.442 0.186 0.342 0.03 
7 0.9725 1.0157 0.852 0.017 0.131 0 0.505 0.146 0.326 0.023 
8 0.9733 0.9812 0.873 0.018 0.109 0 0.53 0.135 0.313 0.022 
15 
9 1.0253 0.9938 0.86 0.024 0.116 0 0.432 0.198 0.338 0.032 
10 0.9769 0.9935 0.858 0.024 0.118 0 0.367 0.261 0.333 0.039 
11 0.9952 0.9937 0.894 0.015 0.091 0 0.39 0.241 0.335 0.034 
12 0.9930 0.9934 0.886 0.016 0.098 0 0.366 0.255 0.341 0.038 
13 0.9641 0.9807 0.905 0.015 0.08 0 0.365 0.27 0.328 0.037 
14 1.0350 1.0065 0.906 0.019 0.075 0 0.338 0.274 0.346 0.042 
15 1.0235 1.0263 0.901 0.018 0.081 0 0.288 0.316 0.353 0.043 
16 0.9675 0.9840 0.911 0.015 0.074 0 0.294 0.315 0.35 0.041 
17 1.0303 1.0293 0.922 0.013 0.065 0 0.308 0.32 0.327 0.045 
18 0.9925 1.0204 0.929 0.011 0.06 0 0.278 0.335 0.344 0.043 
19 0.9979 0.9864 0.926 0.015 0.059 0 0.263 0.353 0.336 0.048 
20 1.0238 1.0061 0.913 0.014 0.073 0 0.229 0.394 0.322 0.055 
21 1.0232 0.9875 0.904 0.012 0.084 0 0.227 0.393 0.32 0.06 
22 1.0495 1.0034 0.894 0.013 0.093 0 0.237 0.376 0.333 0.054 
23 0.9784 1.0219 0.918 0.008 0.074 0 0.262 0.358 0.335 0.045 
24 0.9945 0.9506 0.932 0.003 0.065 0 0.3 0.325 0.337 0.038 
25 1.0378 1.0067 0.928 0.006 0.066 0 0.284 0.332 0.34 0.044 
26 1.0423 1.0098 0.944 0.005 0.051 0 0.328 0.308 0.328 0.036 
27 0.9632 0.9710 0.957 0.004 0.039 0 0.369 0.282 0.322 0.027 
28 0.9811 0.9968 0.969 0.002 0.029 0 0.407 0.244 0.331 0.018 
29 1.0420 1.0496 0.978 0 0.022 0 0.432 0.231 0.319 0.018 
30 1.0242 1.0187 0.979 0 0.021 0 0.43 0.23 0.322 0.018 
31 1.0037 1.0187 0.978 0 0.022 0 0.445 0.219 0.32 0.016 
32 1.0083 1.0544 0.985 0 0.015 0 0.431 0.217 0.336 0.016 
 
It is seen that agents react to a shock with one time-interval lag and that its 
consequences last throughout the game.  
 
 
0.8u =  
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We now increase initial share of agents preferring stocks of CreditSuisse, thus 
0.8u = . The value of 0.3pi =  and does not change in time. A simulation of the 
game is plotted in Figure 7a, b. 
 
Figure 7a: Game with omniscient agents 
 
 
 
Figure 7b: Game with omniscient agents 
 
 
 
Under new circumstances, omniscient agents are no longer able to define a 
dominant strategy despite vast majority opt for Citigroup, attaching importance to 
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the information sources and the quality of ties in the social network. The better 
and more heterogeneous ties one has, better solutions such agent is able to adopt. 
 
We now put a shock into the game and plot the results in Figures 8a, b. 
 
Figure 8a: Game with a shock 
 
 
 
Figure 8b: Game with a shock 
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Again, we see that the shock disturbs conditions on the market significantly, for 
which it affects the decision-making of agents very much, while it is persistent 
throughout the game (see also Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Games with no shock and with a shock 
 
t Cr CSr C Cp CSp CS C_s Cp_s CSp_s CS_s 
1 0.9842 0.9679 0.15 0.15 0.4 0.4 0.15 0.15 0.4 0.4 
2 1.0317 1.0032 0.091 0.1 0.438 0.371 0.108 0.114 0.377 0.401 
3 1.0420 0.9968 0.167 0.084 0.605 0.144 0.194 0.109 0.547 0.15 
4 0.9731 1.0132 0.256 0.034 0.668 0.042 0.138 0.126 0.479 0.257 
5 1.0313 1.0099 0.37 0.011 0.609 0.01 0.226 0.088 0.57 0.116 
6 1.0098 1.0227 0.375 0.004 0.614 0.007 0.2 0.09 0.565 0.145 
7 0.9725 1.0157 0.417 0.005 0.575 0.003 0.245 0.069 0.599 0.087 
8 0.9733 0.9812 0.432 0.003 0.563 0.002 0.255 0.063 0.591 0.091 
9 1.0253 0.9938 0.394 0.004 0.601 0.001 0.195 0.081 0.593 0.131 
10 0.9769 0.9935 0.379 0.005 0.615 0.001 0.144 0.1 0.592 0.164 
11 0.9952 0.9937 0.408 0.005 0.587 0 0.163 0.096 0.574 0.167 
12 0.9930 0.9934 0.423 0.005 0.572 0 0.148 0.102 0.566 0.184 
13 0.9641 0.9807 0.422 0.004 0.574 0 0.136 0.113 0.577 0.174 
14 1.0350 1.0065 0.419 0.003 0.578 0 0.127 0.111 0.57 0.192 
15 1.0235 1.0263 0.401 0.007 0.592 0 0.1 0.129 0.55 0.221 
16 0.9675 0.9840 0.408 0.007 0.585 0 0.107 0.135 0.55 0.208 
17 1.0303 1.0293 0.43 0.004 0.566 0 0.104 0.134 0.564 0.198 
18 0.9925 1.0204 0.425 0.004 0.571 0 0.095 0.142 0.546 0.217 
19 0.9979 0.9864 0.416 0.004 0.58 0 0.086 0.147 0.541 0.226 
20 1.0238 1.0061 0.4 0.009 0.591 0 0.066 0.164 0.516 0.254 
21 1.0232 0.9875 0.397 0.008 0.595 0 0.058 0.168 0.521 0.253 
22 1.0495 1.0034 0.409 0.005 0.586 0 0.064 0.158 0.529 0.249 
23 0.9784 1.0219 0.445 0.004 0.551 0 0.076 0.154 0.555 0.215 
24 0.9945 0.9506 0.501 0.002 0.497 0 0.095 0.126 0.595 0.184 
25 1.0378 1.0067 0.479 0.003 0.518 0 0.092 0.122 0.59 0.196 
26 1.0423 1.0098 0.516 0.001 0.483 0 0.116 0.121 0.605 0.158 
19 
27 0.9632 0.9710 0.562 0.001 0.437 0 0.122 0.106 0.627 0.145 
28 0.9811 0.9968 0.592 0.001 0.407 0 0.144 0.095 0.645 0.116 
29 1.0420 1.0496 0.628 0 0.372 0 0.158 0.084 0.65 0.108 
30 1.0242 1.0187 0.627 0 0.373 0 0.164 0.092 0.643 0.101 
31 1.0037 1.0187 0.633 0 0.367 0 0.17 0.087 0.636 0.107 
32 1.0083 1.0544 0.635 0 0.365 0 0.163 0.089 0.644 0.104 
 
 
3.2 Non-omniscient agents 
 
We now turn to non-omniscient agents. Sizes of step are again 0.1  on both 
variables throughout the sample spaces 0 , 1u pi≤ ≤ , and the averages of 15 
realizations of games are represented in Figures 9. 
 
Figure 9a: Non-omniscient agents who choose C 
 
 
 
Figure 9b: Non-omniscient agents who choose Cp 
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Figure 9c: Non-omniscient agents who choose CSp 
 
 
 
Figure 9d: Non-omniscient agents who choose CS 
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Comparing the games with non-omniscient agents to that with omniscient agents, 
we see that the level of omniscience of agents plays very significant role in their 
decision-making. Contrary to the games with omniscient agents, in the non-
omniscient environment, no strategy is dominant in the average of 15 realizations 
of games. Now the relevant factor is no longer the return of stocks, but initial 
preferences of agents, while on average agents somehow split the strategies they 
opt for. 
 
Figure 10a: Non-omniscient agents under shock who choose C 
 
 
 
Figure 10b: Non-omniscient agents under shock who choose Cp 
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Figure 10c: Non-omniscient agents under shock who choose CSp 
 
 
 
Figure 10d: Non-omniscient agents under shock who choose CS 
 
 
 
Figures 10 represent the game with included shock. Comparing the two figures of 
non-omniscient agents, we see that the introduction of a shock does not have a 
significant effect, as non-omniscient agents do not perceive it. For the details, we 
go to the individual games. 
 
 
0.5u =  
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Again, groups of agents preferring each stock are in the start of equal size, thus 
0.5u = , and are changing in time, while 0.3pi =  is constant throughout the 
game. Figures 11a, b presents results of the game without a shock, while Figures 
12a, b presents results of a game with included shock of 500 bps on Citigroup 
stock in 2t = . 
 
Figure 11a: Game with non-omniscient agents 
 
 
 
Figure 11b: Game with non-omniscient agents 
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Figures show that non-omniscient agents have quite different patterns of decision-
making than omniscient agents do.  
 
Figure 12a: Game with a shock 
 
  
 
Figure 12b: Game with a shock 
 
  
 
When comparing the two figures above, we see that a shock does not have an 
influence on the decision-making, as it was the case in the games of omniscient 
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agents. Table 3 represents a comparison of developments of the two games in 
some early stages. 
 
Table 3: Games with no shock and with a shock 
 
t Cr CSr C Cp CSp CS C_s Cp_s CSp_s CS_s 
1 0.9842 0.9679 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.263 0.228 0.263 0.246 
2 1.0317 1.0032 0.238 0.267 0.241 0.254 0.268 0.234 0.257 0.241 
3 1.0420 0.9968 0.23 0.258 0.244 0.268 0.289 0.221 0.258 0.232 
4 0.9731 1.0132 0.229 0.253 0.242 0.276 0.286 0.222 0.252 0.24 
5 1.0313 1.0099 0.238 0.246 0.247 0.269 0.293 0.236 0.243 0.228 
6 1.0098 1.0227 0.234 0.241 0.247 0.278 0.297 0.23 0.232 0.241 
7 0.9725 1.0157 0.253 0.258 0.228 0.261 0.293 0.25 0.232 0.225 
8 0.9733 0.9812 0.253 0.244 0.227 0.276 0.294 0.254 0.223 0.229 
9 1.0253 0.9938 0.254 0.241 0.228 0.277 0.276 0.261 0.244 0.219 
10 0.9769 0.9935 0.244 0.249 0.235 0.272 0.271 0.251 0.259 0.219 
11 0.9952 0.9937 0.229 0.244 0.239 0.288 0.255 0.251 0.273 0.221 
12 0.9930 0.9934 0.231 0.245 0.237 0.287 0.248 0.263 0.267 0.222 
13 0.9641 0.9807 0.238 0.245 0.228 0.289 0.25 0.253 0.27 0.227 
14 1.0350 1.0065 0.25 0.247 0.226 0.277 0.256 0.256 0.267 0.221 
15 1.0235 1.0263 0.24 0.274 0.219 0.267 0.262 0.25 0.27 0.218 
16 0.9675 0.9840 0.242 0.272 0.208 0.278 0.252 0.247 0.286 0.215 
17 1.0303 1.0293 0.245 0.29 0.213 0.252 0.258 0.232 0.3 0.21 
18 0.9925 1.0204 0.237 0.297 0.209 0.257 0.25 0.224 0.299 0.227 
19 0.9979 0.9864 0.246 0.303 0.208 0.243 0.24 0.236 0.293 0.231 
20 1.0238 1.0061 0.244 0.3 0.217 0.239 0.23 0.236 0.308 0.226 
21 1.0232 0.9875 0.247 0.296 0.212 0.245 0.215 0.254 0.308 0.223 
22 1.0495 1.0034 0.245 0.307 0.212 0.236 0.221 0.258 0.304 0.217 
23 0.9784 1.0219 0.247 0.315 0.196 0.242 0.214 0.26 0.307 0.219 
24 0.9945 0.9506 0.24 0.316 0.204 0.24 0.217 0.259 0.314 0.21 
25 1.0378 1.0067 0.237 0.316 0.196 0.251 0.217 0.267 0.315 0.201 
26 1.0423 1.0098 0.228 0.321 0.201 0.25 0.226 0.273 0.311 0.19 
27 0.9632 0.9710 0.234 0.309 0.196 0.261 0.221 0.266 0.317 0.196 
26 
28 0.9811 0.9968 0.244 0.29 0.196 0.27 0.217 0.265 0.324 0.194 
29 1.0420 1.0496 0.246 0.289 0.198 0.267 0.211 0.252 0.332 0.205 
30 1.0242 1.0187 0.253 0.277 0.201 0.269 0.204 0.248 0.334 0.214 
31 1.0037 1.0187 0.246 0.283 0.204 0.267 0.214 0.245 0.327 0.214 
32 1.0083 1.0544 0.249 0.276 0.2 0.275 0.211 0.252 0.328 0.209 
 
 
0.8u =  
 
Finally, we increase the initial share of agents preferring dominated share of 
CreditSuisse to 0.8u = . A game without a shock is plotted in Figures 13a, b, and 
shock is included in Figures 14a, b. Table 4 represents a comparison of 
developments of the two games in some early stages. 
 
Figure 13a: Game with non-omniscient agents 
 
 
 
Figure 13b: Game with non-omniscient agents 
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Figure 14a: Game with a shock 
 
  
 
Figure 14b: Game with a shock 
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Table 4: Games with no shock and with a shock 
 
t Cr CSr C Cp CSp CS C_s Cp_s CSp_s CS_s 
1 0.9842 0.9679 0.15 0.15 0.4 0.4 0.15 0.15 0.4 0.4 
2 1.0317 1.0032 0.086 0.116 0.418 0.38 0.106 0.094 0.407 0.393 
3 1.0420 0.9968 0.097 0.115 0.415 0.373 0.102 0.088 0.418 0.392 
4 0.9731 1.0132 0.088 0.124 0.416 0.372 0.095 0.091 0.402 0.412 
5 1.0313 1.0099 0.078 0.12 0.41 0.392 0.085 0.092 0.408 0.415 
6 1.0098 1.0227 0.075 0.108 0.405 0.412 0.071 0.097 0.4 0.432 
7 0.9725 1.0157 0.076 0.11 0.406 0.408 0.076 0.101 0.391 0.432 
8 0.9733 0.9812 0.075 0.11 0.422 0.393 0.076 0.098 0.381 0.445 
9 1.0253 0.9938 0.075 0.105 0.434 0.386 0.076 0.105 0.4 0.419 
10 0.9769 0.9935 0.063 0.112 0.437 0.388 0.077 0.117 0.387 0.419 
11 0.9952 0.9937 0.061 0.121 0.436 0.382 0.072 0.119 0.405 0.404 
12 0.9930 0.9934 0.061 0.131 0.43 0.378 0.089 0.121 0.396 0.394 
13 0.9641 0.9807 0.06 0.133 0.416 0.391 0.085 0.121 0.384 0.41 
14 1.0350 1.0065 0.059 0.137 0.425 0.379 0.093 0.122 0.397 0.388 
15 1.0235 1.0263 0.052 0.145 0.423 0.38 0.089 0.116 0.407 0.388 
16 0.9675 0.9840 0.056 0.147 0.424 0.373 0.091 0.119 0.412 0.378 
17 1.0303 1.0293 0.053 0.142 0.417 0.388 0.094 0.118 0.418 0.37 
18 0.9925 1.0204 0.052 0.14 0.413 0.395 0.086 0.117 0.414 0.383 
29 
19 0.9979 0.9864 0.054 0.145 0.426 0.375 0.083 0.118 0.421 0.378 
20 1.0238 1.0061 0.049 0.144 0.436 0.371 0.085 0.117 0.41 0.388 
21 1.0232 0.9875 0.047 0.154 0.441 0.358 0.095 0.11 0.422 0.373 
22 1.0495 1.0034 0.044 0.142 0.437 0.377 0.086 0.112 0.419 0.383 
23 0.9784 1.0219 0.044 0.136 0.434 0.386 0.09 0.12 0.427 0.363 
24 0.9945 0.9506 0.043 0.134 0.43 0.393 0.09 0.112 0.416 0.382 
25 1.0378 1.0067 0.041 0.129 0.434 0.396 0.097 0.112 0.414 0.377 
26 1.0423 1.0098 0.046 0.128 0.437 0.389 0.095 0.121 0.418 0.366 
27 0.9632 0.9710 0.043 0.124 0.454 0.379 0.095 0.108 0.437 0.36 
28 0.9811 0.9968 0.039 0.126 0.463 0.372 0.1 0.102 0.452 0.346 
29 1.0420 1.0496 0.038 0.125 0.455 0.382 0.104 0.116 0.44 0.34 
30 1.0242 1.0187 0.029 0.133 0.455 0.383 0.109 0.118 0.43 0.343 
31 1.0037 1.0187 0.027 0.136 0.474 0.363 0.112 0.118 0.429 0.341 
32 1.0083 1.0544 0.033 0.14 0.457 0.37 0.103 0.112 0.443 0.342 
 
The last figures and the table correspond to the Figure 9 and Figure 10, which 
demonstrated the behavior of non-omniscient agents. It has been demonstrated 
that non-omniscient agents are almost immune to one-time shocks, for which they 
do not alter their behavior significantly. 
 
4 Concluding remarks 
 
It has been demonstrated that effects that shocks have on decision-making of 
agents on financial markets largely depend on the levels of omniscience of agents. 
Omniscient agents very quickly respond on the market conditions with a one time-
period lag, while non-omniscient agents do not. Despite omniscient agents 
overcome it, introduction of a shock has huge long-run consequences, as it 
changes the inter-game conditions, leading us to a butterfly-effect in financial 
decision-making. 
 
It has also been proved that information channels, i.e. positions of agents in social 
networks, are of a decisive importance in the process of decision-making of 
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agents, which is true especially in the environment of omniscient agents. This 
leads omniscient agents to far more frequently behave in herds than non-
omniscient agents do. On the short run, especially when stock returns are wide 
apart, making a portfolio is very frequent solution for agents that face decreasing 
returns on stocks they possess. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Abreu, D., Brunnermeier, M. (2003). Bubbles and Crashes. Econometrica, 
71(1), 173-204. 
2. Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D., Welch I. (1998). Learning from the 
Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Information Cascades. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 12(3), 151-170. 
3. Cont, R., Bouchaud, J-P. (2000). Herd Behavior and Aggregate Fluctuations 
in Financial Markets. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 4(2), 170-197. 
4. Hayek, F.A. (1945). The Use of Knowledge in Society. American Economic 
Review, 35(4), 519-530. 
5. Hirshleifer, D. (2002). Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing. Journal of 
Finance, 56(4), 1533-1597. 
6. Kahneman, D., Tversky A. (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
under Risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263-291. 
7. Lux, T. (1995). Herd Behavior, Bubbles, and Crashes. Economic Journal, 
105(431), 881-896. 
8. Mises, L. (1996). Human Action: A Treatise on Economics. Fourth Edition. 
San Francisco: Fox and Wilkes. 
9. Rand, A. (1964). The Virtue of Selfishness. New York: Signet. 
10. Rubinstein, A. (1998). Modeling Bounded Rationality. Cambridge: MIT 
Press. 
11. Shiller, R. (2002). Irrational Exuberance. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
12. Szabó, G., Tőke C. (1998). Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma Game on a 
Square Lattice. Physical Review E, 58(1), 69-73. 
13. Wasserman, S., Faust K. (1998). Social Network Analysis: Methods and 
Applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
14. Watts, D., Strogatz S. (1998). Collective Dynamics of Small World Networks. 
Nature, 393(4), 440-442. 
 
Figures legend 
C , plotted with black line, represents the share of agents who prefer Citigroup stocks and play 
pure strategies, Cp , plotted with red line, represents the share of agents who prefer Citigroup 
stocks and opt for a portfolio. CS , plotted with green line, and CSp , plotted with blue line, 
represent shares of agents who prefer CreditSuisse stocks and opt for pure strategies or portfolio. 
Color-palettes in Figures 3, 4, 9, and 10 represent shares of agents who opt for a particular strategy 
in last time-interval. 
